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This editorial introduces a special issue of Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology, centring on 
the convergence of the physical, mental and virtual. The idea of publishing a special issue on this 
matter came about at a conference, ICT that makes the difference, organised by the consortium of a
FP7-funded project, ICTethics.1 In particular, we wanted to foreground some of the material 
presented and debated in sessions on the role of assistive robotics, the use of RFIDs and other 
implants for brain/body-device interactions, and issues surrounding ‘medical access to the brain’. 
The special issue takes as its point of departure the gap that exists between the visionary work 
and experimentation undertaken by scientists, and the results of theoretical and practical reflection 
on issues of ethical, legal and social relevance. One of the objectives of the ICTethics project is to 
investigate how ELSA studies can be operationally embedded in the early stages of ICT design 
and development, as well as in agenda setting for S&T research. But to what extent do scientists, 
policy-makers, ELSA scholars and other stakeholders network and communicate to bring about 
improved conditions for good governance and professional accountability? The special issue 
brings together cutting-edge experimenters, philosophers and ELSA scholars, as both authors and 
commentators, to explore some of the latest developments that manifest convergence of the 
physical, mental and virtual, and relate them specifically to issues of selfhood, identity and 
responsibility, empathy, medical ethics, social robustness and accountability. In doing this, we 
hope to set an example of how radically different disciplines can communicate and complement 
each other’s work.
Robots as pets and friends?
A policy perspective published by the European Commission (European Commission, 2008) 
states that “[t]omorrow’s robots will not be confined to industry, but work in the ‘real world’, 
providing solutions for many societal issues”. Indeed, we learn from EU policy frameworks such 
as the i2020 initiative (European Commission, 2010) that current societal challenges will be met 
with a wave of innovations to which new and emerging ICTs are essential, including robotics.  
1 The international conference, ICT that makes the difference, took place at Hotel Métropole in Brussels, 22-25 
November 2009. ICTethics is funded under FP7 Science-in-Society-2008-1.1.2.1, Ethics and new and emerging 
fields of science and technology (Capacities Programme), contract nr. FP7-230368.
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Robots will be assistants, co-operating with people in everyday environments, and in ways that are
sensitive to ordinary goings-on—even helping to optimise social decision-making (see also 
EUROP, 2009).
We might look forward to sharing our lives with perceptive and cognitive robots, with 
integrated sensors and free-range mobility. Engineers have come under growing pressure to 
develop machine intelligence that is more in-hand and at-home in both production and common 
everyday affairs. Representative models of mind gave way to models of neural networks and 
reinforced learning, complex sensory technologies, embodied intelligence and, more recently, 
models of social intelligence and affective experience (e.g. Breazeal, 2003). The last on the list 
serves the attempt to embed artificial agents in emotionally sensitive and socially relevant 
activities.
Although the robots we see in films such as iRobot and Terminator are not on the horizon, a 
significant development in recent years turns on the companionship we may have of robots as pets 
or friends. For example, ‘Paro’ is a therapeutic robot seal, shown to reduce patient stress, improve 
motivation, and stimulate interaction between patients and their caregivers.2 Paro is promoted as a 
companion to the elderly and those suffering from dementia or autism. But what does 
‘companionship’ stand for in human-robot relations? This question is explored by Mark 
Coeckelbergh in the special issue where he challenges the objection that such companionships are 
deceptive—that a robot is always merely a machine and cannot meet social and emotional needs. 
Accordingly, to rely on robots in the care of vulnerable people would be morally apprehensible 
(see e.g. Sparrow and Sparrow, 2006 on the future of aged care). What we learn from Mark’s 
argument is that human-robot relations can be seen as something more akin to the relationships 
children form with dolls and teddy bears, or adults with their pets and favourite gadgets—relations
that mirror our own vulnerabilities, evoke empathy and a sense of ‘fellow feeling’, however, we 
should be careful not to believe that such relations can replace the company of other humans.
The human-machine merger
Two of the articles in the special issue are written by scientists, Kevin Warwick and Rolando 
Meloni, et al., who make it clear that they are first and foremost experimenters in their respective 
fields. They are not ethicists, legal scholars or sociologists. They agreed to describe the 
experiments they are involved in, and explain the latest trends in their fields to the readers of the 
journal. They express the understanding that reflection on the ethical, legal and social implications 
of the work they do is both timely and necessary but, also, that they themselves may not be best 
suited to identify potential complications. Therefore, their papers are complemented with 
comments by relevant experts.
Most of the special issue is dedicated to these exchanges, dealing with what Warwick calls 
2 See http://www.parorobots.com/ .
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‘human-machine merger’. This is a broadly defined category, involving the development of 
human-machine interfaces to directly insert and/or extract signals. Warwick explains to the reader 
how brain cells are grown on a computer chip, fitted to control a simple robot body. We can ask 
what the limitations are to the size and capacity of such a brain, say, if the brain cells were human 
and the robot body equipped with cutting-edge sensory technologies. He also discusses the use of 
RFID tags for the tracking and positioning of persons, and experiments with active implants to 
control objects and devices, and modify brain functions. For example, neuro-degenerative diseases
are dealt with by targeting brain cells with electromagnetic signals such as in the treatment of 
Parkinson’s disease. Can these deep brain stimulations be controlled in a ‘smarter’ way, he asks. 
Meloni, et al., also explain in the special issue how deep brain stimulation could be complemented 
with the insertion of genetic material to restore or prevent further degeneration in the brain. They 
aptly note however, that direct access to the brain for medical purposes is still very complicated 
and far from risk free, even if scientists have proof of principle and some success. Similarly, 
Elisabeth Hildt draws attention to the experimental character of current methods to extract brain 
signals for medical purposes. We can make use of brain activity by extracting signals from scalp 
readings, she explains. These are non-invasive techniques offering unique opportunities to persons 
with motor impairments to control mechanical devices and better communicate with those around 
them. But, even if scalp readings are making their way into computer gaming experience, they are 
still applied in controlled environments for medical purposes and riddled with complications. The 
invasive technologies, brain implants, are far less developed but the attraction is that they promise 
to deliver much higher resolution of brain activity, taking human-computer interaction to a whole 
new level, prosthetic limb control for example.
Hildt has had the opportunity to work in clinical and experimental settings and gives an account
in her article of common ethical concerns. Apart from the multitude of potential physical 
complications when devices are implanted, there are questions of how to obtain informed consent, 
say, from ‘locked-in’ persons. There are significant risks of psychosocial affects relating to 
disappointment and frustration when a brain-computer interface fails to deliver in spite of 
extensive training, when devices and systems are withdrawn after a successful trial, and so on. 
There are questions of hope and promise, and the extent to which quality of life can actually be 
improved with more independence, privacy and social participation. James Giordano also takes 
medical ethics as a point of departure in his comment on the work of Meloni et al. In addition to 
the concerns raised by Hildt, he raises the question of how to establish the legal ramifications and 
how to address issues of justice: “how shall decisions of which patients receive these state-of-the-
art technologies be addressed, deliberated and articulated?”
Together, these questions draw attention to the manner in which benefits, risks and burden are 
estimated and articulated in experimental and clinical practice—in communication among experts, 
with policy-makers, patients, and other relevant stakeholders. They point to a pervasive problem of
how to regulate new and emerging technologies in ways that can clarify legal ramifications and 
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improve professional and regulatory accountability. Furthermore, there remain unresolved 
questions of how to distribute access to treatments that are most likely to be beneficial and how to 
avoid the most vulnerable persons from receiving risky treatments in the name of ‘empowerment’. 
But the opportunities that lie in convergent technologies, such as human-machine mergers and the 
use of implants, go well beyond clinical purposes (Nordmann, 2004; Kjølberg et al, 2008). There 
are further ethical, occupational and organisational challenges (e.g. Rodotà and Capurro, 2005 on 
the ethical aspects of implants). For example, Warwick suggests that children or those with 
dementia could be micro-chipped for safety and Juliet Lodge, in her comment, reminds us that 
there are always some persons relying on someone else, some RFID reader, some other machine, 
to respond to warning signs. Despite all good intentions, there is no guarantee that technical 
solutions like implants will deliver better safety or better organised service, nor that they will not 
be used for malign purposes. We need to think through the challenges in a socially robust manner, 
sensitive to the ways in which we know humans to be resourceful and competent, but also lazy and
inconsistent—sensitive to questions of responsible and sustainable innovations, taking into 
account the occupational and organisational challenges they engender, as well as new powers and 
economies. 
Finally, different methods of directly accessing the brain suggest new capabilities which can 
radically change what it means to be human, to have a self and identity, to be liable for one’s 
actions, and so forth. The classical line of reasoning here rests on an ancient notion of humans as 
bounded entities with inherent attributes. Conversely, the problems raised by merging humans and 
devices centre on questions of how much human agency can be extended to devices, for what 
purposes we want to enhance human capabilities, if the individual is no longer responsible for her 
actions when a device overrides her will or the self no longer that self. Another way of looking at 
these developments is to say that new hybrid agencies emerge when devices and humans are 
intimately interdependent while performing certain tasks. Accordingly, any new capabilities for 
action or human enhancement more generally, will have to be assessed in their own right. For 
example, Ruth Chadwick asks in her comment on Warwick’s work whether active implants, 
enabling direct communication between two human nervous systems, is necessarily an 
improvement of ordinary communication and how we usually get to know each other. Assessing 
improvement “may involve a moral or aesthetic judgement” rather than a judgement strictly about 
effectiveness. Søren Holm and Teck Chuan Voo also underscore the differentiation between 
philosophical speculation about self and individual responsibility, and how we might justify 
compensations if hybrid agents offend. If necessary, recompense is established in legal proceeding.
It is negotiated with reference to normative judgements, reasonable certainties and doubts about 
the ordinary behaviours of humans and things in particular circumstance. As Mireille Hildebrandt 
has pointed out, we inscribe laws into computational functions and further developments in that 
direction may spell the end of ‘law’ as we know it (Hildebrandt, 2009). Computationally inscribed 
laws make certain tasks possible and other tasks impossible. Laws as we ordinarily know them 
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however, can always be broken and the court of law has always been an elbowroom for 
negotiation and mitigation. Legal proceedings and judgement are not an exact science but a space 
within which reasonable certainties and reasonable doubts are established. 
As we can see, enormous opportunities lie in the latest developments which are grouped here 
under convergence of the physical, mental and virtual. We see opportunities to restore or modify 
normal human functions, to support communication and companionships, and sort out matters of 
safety and security. The special issue only begins to explore some of the implications for 
individual and social well-being. We believe there is a need to do much more in order to ensure 
responsible and sustainable innovations in this area, for which we hope this publication makes a 
contribution.
Bibliography
Breazeal, C. (2003). Toward sociable robots. Robotics and Autonomous Systems 42(). pp. 167-75. 
EUROP (2009). Robotics Visions to 2020 and Beyond - The Strategic Research Agenda for 
Robotics in Europe, 07/2009. Coordination Action for Robotics in Europe (CARE). 
European Commission (2010). Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth. Communication of the European Commission.
European Commission (2008). ICT Research. The Policy Perspective: European robots, getting 
smarter, safer, and more sensitive. European Commission. http://cordis.europa.eu/ictresults
Hildebrandt, M. (2009). Technology and the end of law. In E. Claes and B. Keirsbilck (eds) 
Facing the limits of the law. Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 443-64. 
Kjølberg, K., Delgado-Ramos, G. C., Wickson, F., et al. (2008). Models of governance for 
converging technologies. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 20(1). pp. 83-97. 
Nordmann, A. (Rapporteur) (2004). Converging Technologies – Shaping the Future of European 
Societies. European Commission - HLEG Foresighting the New Technology Wave. 
Rodotà, S. and Capurro, R. (2005). Ethical aspects of ICT implants in the human body: Opinion 
produced on the direct initiative of the EGE. European Group on Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies to the European Commission. 
Sparrow, R. and Sparrow, L. (2006). In the hands of machines? The future of aged care. Mind and 
Machines 16(2). pp. 141-61.
5
